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Future contingents are contingent statements about the future — such as
future events, actions, states etc. To qualify as contingent the predicted
event, state, action or whatever is at stake must neither be impossible nor
inevitable. Statements such as “My mother shall go to London” or “There
will be a sea-battle tomorrow” could serve as standard examples. What
could be called the problem of future contingents concerns how to ascribe
truth-values to such statements. If there are several possible decisions out
of which one is going to be made freely tomorrow, can there be a truth
now about which one will be made? If ‘yes’, on what grounds could
something which is still open, nevertheless be true already now? If ‘no’,
can we in fact hold that all logically exclusive possibilities must be untrue
without denying that one of the possible outcomes must turn out to be the
chosen one?[1]
In point of fact, ‘future contingents’ could also refer to future contingent
objects. A statement like “The first astronaut to go to Mars will have a
unique experience” could be analyzed as referring to an object not yet
existing, supposing that one day in the distant future some person will
indeed travel to Mars, but that person has not yet been born. The notion of
‘future contingent objects’ involves important philosophical questions, for
instance the issue of ethical obligations towards future generations,
quantification over ‘future contingent objects’ etc. However, this entry is
confined to the study of future contingent statements.
The problem of future contingents is interwoven with a number of issues
in theology, philosophy, logic, semantics of natural language, computer
science, and applied mathematics. The theological issue of how to
reconcile the assumption of God's foreknowledge with the freedom and
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moral accountability of human beings has been a main impetus to the
discussion and a major inspiration to the development of various logical
models of time and future contingents. This theological issue is connected
with the general philosophical question of determinism versus
indeterminism. Within logic, the relation between time and modality must
be studied and various models satisfying various assumptions with respect
to the structure of time must be developed and investigated. The project of
formal semantics for natural languages also has to address the problem of
how to ascribe a correct semantics to statements about the future. Finally,
it should be mentioned that temporal logic has found a remarkable
application in computer science and applied mathematics (see Hasle and
Øhrstrøm 2004).
In the present context the issue of future contingents will be approached
from the viewpoint of philosophical logic with due consideration to
philosophical-theological origins.
1. The Discussion of Future Contingency and Its Background in
Ancient and Medieval Logic
2. A Formalisation of the Classical Argument
3. Branching Time Semantics
4. The Solutions Based on Rejection of the Principle of Future
Excluded Middle
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4.2 The Peircean Solution
5. The Solutions Based on the Rejection of the Necessity of the Past
5.1 Prior's Ockhamist Solution
5.2 The Leibnizian Theory
5.3 The True Futurist Theory: The Thin Red Line









1. The Discussion of Future Contingency and Its
Background in Ancient and Medieval Logic
Future contingents appear to hold a strange quality when compared with
present or past tense statements, such as “it is raining” or “Napoleon lost
at Waterloo”, whose truth-value does not depend on future states or events.
For it seems straightforward to claim that the latter two sentences are true
if and only if the states or events in question correspond with reality. But
can it make sense to claim that the truth or falsity of a contingent future
statement, such as “The first human being to set foot on Mars will be a
woman”, depends on the future reality in a similar manner? Clearly, this
can only make sense if we can meaningfully refer to the future reality in
the same way as we can refer to the past reality. However, if the future is
open such a reference may be rather problematic.
The philosophical and logical challenge to which the future contingency
discussion gives rise is two-fold. First of all, anyone who wants to
maintain some kind of indeterminism regarding the future, may be
confronted with some standard arguments in favor of logical determinism,
i.e., arguments designed to demonstrate that there are no future
contingents at all. In addition, anyone who holds that there are future
contingents can be challenged to establish a reasonable truth-theory
compatible with the idea of an open future. Such a theory should provide
answers to questions like: Can one meaningfully regard future contingents
as true or false now, if the future is open? And if so, how? Can assertions
about the contingent future make any sense at all? And if so, how? Some
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logicians have held that no future contingent is true. However, other
logicians have found that this is unacceptable. Instead, they have looked
for a theoretical basis on which we might hold that a future contingent is
true (or false).
Already Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) was aware of the problem of future
contingents. Chapter IX of his work, On Interpretation, is without doubt
the philosophical text which has had the greatest impact on the debate
about the relations between time, truth, and possibility. The discussion in
this text certainly bears witness to the fact that Ancient philosophy was
highly conscious of tense-logical problems. Central to the discussion in
this famous Aristotelian text is the question of how to interpret the
following two statements:
Aristotle considered questions like: Should we say that one of these
statements is true today and the other false? How can we make a clear
distinction between what is going to happen tomorrow and what must
happen tomorrow? (See On Interpretation, 18 b 23 ff.).
The interpretative problems regarding Aristotle's logical problem about
the sea-battle tomorrow are by no means simple. Over the centuries, many
philosophers and logicians have formulated their interpretations of the
Aristotelian text (see Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995, p. 10 ff.). In the following
we shall present an interpretation of the text from the scholastic period and
a modern interpretation based on a three-valued semantics.
In the generation after Aristotle, Diodorus Cronus (ca. 340–280 B.C.E.)
analysed similar problems using his so-called Master Argument. This
“Tomorrow there will be a sea-battle”
“Tomorrow there will not be a sea-battle”
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argument was a trilemma. According to Epictetus, Diodorus argued that
the following three propositions cannot all be true:
Diodorus used this incompatibility combined with the plausibility of (D1)
and (D2) to argue that (D3) is false. Assuming (D1) and (D2) he went on
to define the possible as “that which either is or will be true” and the
necessary as “that which, being true, will not be false”. In this way his
argument seems to have been designed to demonstrate that there cannot be
any future contingency at all. However, little is known about the way in
which Diodorus used his premises in order to reach the conclusion. The
reconstruction of the Master Argument certainly constitutes a genuine
problem within the history of logic. Various philosophers and logicians
have tried to reconstruct the argument as it might have been. It is very
likely that the main structure of the argument was close to the argument
presented in the next section. (See (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995, p. 15 ff.)
and (Gaskin 1995) for references to the literature on the Master
Argument.)
The discussion took on a particularly interesting form in the Middle Ages.
During the Middle Ages logicians related their discipline to theology. One
of the most important theological questions was the problem of the
contingent future in relation to Christian doctrine. According to Christian
tradition, divine foreknowledge comprises knowledge of the future
choices to be made by men and women. But this assumption apparently
gives rise to a straightforward argument from divine foreknowledge to the
(D1) Every proposition true about the past is necessary.
(D2) An impossible proposition cannot follow from a possible
one.[2]
(D3) There is a proposition which is possible, but which neither is
nor will be true.
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necessity of the future: if God already now knows which decision I will
make tomorrow, then a now-unpreventable truth about my choice
tomorrow is already given. My choice, then, appears to be necessary, not
free. Hence, there seems to be no basis for the claim that I have a free
choice between genuine alternatives. This conclusion, however, violates
the idea of human freedom and moral accountability presupposed in much
theology (though not all).
The medieval discussion regarding the logic of divine foreknowledge is,
from a formal point of view, very close to the classical discussion
concerning future contingency. If we add the assumption that necessarily,
something is true if and only if it is known to God, then it is easy to see
how the discussion regarding the logic of divine foreknowledge is, from a
formal point of view, essentially the same discussion as the classical
discussion concerning future contingency. This was clearly realised by the
medieval logicians.
In his treatise De eventu futurorum, Lavenham (c. 1380) gave a succinct
overview over the basic approaches to the problem within scholasticism
(see Øhrstrøm 1983, Tuggy 1999). Lavenham considered a central
argument leading from God's foreknowledge to the necessity of the future
and the lack of proper human freedom. In fact, the various positions on
future contingency may be presented as possible reactions to this
argument. The main structure of this argument is very close to what is
believed to have been the Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus (see
Gaskin 1995). It is clear from Lavenham's text that he had some
knowledge of this old Stoic or Megaric argument, probably through his
reading of Cicero's De Fato. The main idea is to transfer the assumed
necessity of the past to the future. In order to make things clearer one
might state the argument in terms of yesterday and tomorrow, instead of
past and future in general (as Lavenham tends to do). A non-theological
version of the argument can be presented in the following way. In this
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sequence E is some event, which may or may not take place tomorrow
(e.g. a sea-battle). Non-E is just a state of affairs without E occurring. E
and non-E are supposed to be mutually exclusive.
1. Either E is going to take place tomorrow or non-E is going to take
place tomorrow. (Assumption).
2. If a proposition about the past is true, then it is now necessary, i.e.,
inescapable or unpreventable. (Assumption).
3. If E is going to take place tomorrow, then it is true that yesterday it
was the case that E would take place in two days. (Assumption).
4. If E is going to take place tomorrow, then it is now necessary that
yesterday E would take place in two days. (Follows from 2. and 3.).
5. If it is now necessary that yesterday E would take place in two days,
then it is now necessary that E is going to take place tomorrow.
(Assumption).
6. If E is going to take place tomorrow, then E is necessarily going to
take place tomorrow. (Follows from 4. and 5.).
7. If non-E is going to take place tomorrow, then non-E is necessarily
going to take place tomorrow. (Follows by the same kind of
reasoning as 6.).
8. Either E is necessarily going to take place tomorrow or non-E is
necessarily going to take place tomorrow. (Follows from 1., 6. and
7.).
9. Therefore, what is going to happen tomorrow is going to happen with
necessity. (Follows from 8.).
Lavenham accepted the validity of this argument, and he pointed out that
one should consider four possible reactions to it. He presented this
classification in a theological context, but it can be translated into non-
theological language. Assuming that necessarily, something is true if and
only if it is known to God, the four possible reactions in Lavenham's
analysis can be listed in the following way:
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Clearly, if we don't want to accept the deterministic conclusion of the
above argument, and if the argument is accepted as valid, then we have to
question at least one of the premises. Not taking premise 5 into
consideration, this leaves us with the premises 1, 2, and 3. According to
the reaction (b), premise 3 is rejected. Reaction (c) implies the rejection of
premise 1 in the argument. Reaction (d) implies the rejection of premise 2.
Lavenham took option (a) to imply that there is no human freedom. In his
understanding (b) would mean that God does not know future contingents.
He rejected both (a) and (b) as contrary to the Christian faith.
It seems that Lavenham, like William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347), took
Aristotle to hold that propositions about the contingent future are neither
true nor false. A number of scholastic logicians favored this Aristotelian
view (c), for instance Peter Aureole (c.1280–1322). Lavenham, however,
rejected this view. He insisted that future contingents are either true or
false now, and that God knows the truth-values of all future contingents.
He preferred (d), and he argued that by rejecting the necessity of the past
as a general principle the doctrines of free will and God's foreknowledge
of the contingent future can be united in a consistent manner. This solution
(a) Accept the above argument (including its premises). Grant
that there are no future contingents, i.e., statements about the
future are either impossible or necessary.
(b) Deny that if a certain event is going to occur, then it is true
that it has always been the case that it would occur.
(c) Deny the following: For any possible event, which might
occur at a certain time in the future, either it will be that the
event takes place at that future time, or it will be that the event
does not take place at that time.
(d) Deny that the past in general is necessary.
Future Contingents
8 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
was first formulated by Ockham, although some of its elements can
already be found in Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109). It is also
interesting that Leibniz (1646–1711) much later worked with a similar
idea as a part of his metaphysics. (See Øhrstrøm 1984.)
The most characteristic feature of Lavenham's solution is the concept of
the true future. The view is that God possesses certain knowledge not only
of the necessary future, but also of the contingent future. This means that
among the possible contingent futures there must be one which has a
special status, namely that it corresponds to the course of events which is
going to happen or take place in the future. This line of thinking may be
called the medieval solution, even though other approaches certainly
existed. Its justification is partly the observation that the notion of the true
future is the specifically medieval contribution to the discussion, and
partly that leading medieval logicians regarded this solution as the best
one. Lavenham himself called it ‘opinio modernorum’, i.e., the opinion of
the modern people. Lavenham argued that the notion of the true future can
be maintained together with indeterminism, if the assumption of the
necessity of the past is rejected. This will be explained in more detail in
sections 2 and 5.
A later contribution by the Jesuit Luis Molina (1535–1600) is relevant for
a modern interpretation of the concept of the true future. Molina's ideas
have been thoroughly discussed in (Craig 1988). Molina's special
contribution is the idea of (God's) middle knowledge, “by which, in virtue
of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each free will, He
saw in His own essence what each such will would do with its innate
freedom were it to be placed in this or that or indeed in infinitely many
orders of things — even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to
do the opposite” (quoted from Craig 1988, p. 175). Craig goes on to
explain it as follows: “… whereas by His natural knowledge God knows
that, say, Peter when placed in a certain set of circumstances could either
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betray Christ or not betray Christ, being free to do either under identical
circumstances, by His middle knowledge God knows what Peter would do
if placed under those circumstances” (Craig 1988, p. 175).
As Lavenham knew, William of Ockham had discussed the problem of
divine foreknowledge and human freedom in his work Tractatus de
praedestinatione et de futuris contingentibus. (See William of Ockham
1969.) Ockham asserted that God knows the truth or falsity of all future
contingents, but he also maintained that human beings can choose between
alternative possibilities. In his Tractatus he argued that the doctrines of
divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. Richard of
Lavenham made a remarkable effort to capture and clearly present the
logical features of Ockham's system as opposed to (what was assumed to
be) Aristotle's solution, i.e., (c).
In the following section a formal version of the medieval argument for
determinism will be presented without theological references. It will be
demonstrated that at least two of the premises used in the argument may
be questioned. In section 3 we shall present a particularly important
framework for the discussion of future contingents known as branching
time and its semantics. In sections 4 and 5 we shall see how these possible
reactions to the classical argument may be turned into modern truth-
theories corresponding to the medieval positions listed above.
2. A Formalisation of the Classical Argument
The argument can be reformulated using the modern (metric) tense logic
suggested by A.N. Prior (1914–69) with
F(x) “in x time units it will be the case that …”
P(x) “x time units ago it was the case that …”
□ “it is necessary that …”
Future Contingents
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It should, however, be noted that Prior also often used tense-operators
without any reference to time units. He used F for “it will be the case that
…” and P for “it has been the case that …”. In terms of these non-metric
tense-operators he defined the operators, G and H, as ~F~ and ~P~
respectively. G may be read “it will always be the case that …”, and H
may be read “it has always been the case that …”. Using these non-metric
tense-operators Prior (1967, p. 32 ff.) even formulated a reconstruction of
the Diodorean Master Argument which comes rather close to the classical
argument which we shall present in the following.
It is essential to notice that the necessity at stake in the classical argument
is a historical necessity. This means that what is not necessary at one
moment may become necessary at another moment. Instead of speaking
about what is necessary we might – as already hinted at – talk about what
is now settled, inevitable, inescapable, or unpreventable.
The argument may be understood as based on the following five
principles, where p and q represent arbitrary well-formed statements
within the logic:
(P1) and (P2) are basic tense-logical claims which can serve as crucial
elements in a formalization of the argument mentioned in section 1. (P3)
may be labeled the ‘necessity of the past’. (P4) is a theorem well-known
from standard modal logic. (P5) may be read as a version of the principle
of the excluded middle (‘tertium non datur’), although it does not take the
(P1) F(y)p ⊃ P(x)F(x)F(y)p
(P2) □(P(x)F(x)p ⊃ p)
(P3) P(x)p ⊃ □P(x)p
(P4) (□ (p ⊃ q) ∧ □p) ⊃ □q
(P5) F(x)p ∨ F(x)~p
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exact form of p ∨ ~p. In order to avoid confusion, we shall use the
modified name, ‘future excluded middle’, for (P5).
Let q stand for some atomic statement such that F(y)q is a statement about
the contingent future. Formally, then, the argument goes as follows:
Similarly, it is possible to prove
The second part of the main proof is carried out in the following way:
Remember now that q may stand for any atomic proposition, including
statements about human actions. Therefore, (8) is equivalent to a claim of
determinism, i.e., that there are no future contingents. So if one wants to
preserve indeterminism, at least one of the above principles (P1–5) has to
be rejected.
A.N. Prior constructed two systems showing how that can be done,
namely the Peircean system (in which (P1) and (P5) are rejected) and the
Ockhamist system (in which (P3) is rejected). Formally, each of these
systems offers a basis for the rejection of the claim of determinism as
expressed in (8). As we shall see in the next section the same can be said
(1) F(y)q ⊃ P(x)F(x)F(y)q (P1)
(2) P(x)F(x)F(y)q ⊃ □P(x)F(x)F(y)q (from (P3))
(3) F(y)q ⊃ □P(x)F(x)F(y)q (from (1) & (2))
(4) □(P(x)F(x)F(y)q ⊃ F(y)q) (from (P2))
(5) F(y)q ⊃ □F(y)q (from (3), (4), (P4))
(6) F(y)~q ⊃ □F(y)~q
(7) F(y)q ∨ F(y)~q (from (P5))
(8) □F(y)q ∨ □F(y)~q (from (5), (6), (7))
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about Jan Łukasiewicz' three-valued semantics, which Prior himself
investigated further (see Prior 1953), and which also involves a rejection
of (P5). Since Prior, several philosophers have discussed which one of
these systems should be accepted, or whether other and more attractive
systems dealing with the problem can be constructed. In sections 4 and 5
we shall see how the various solutions to the problem of future contingents
can be grouped according to their consequences with respect to (P3) and
(P5).
3. Branching Time Semantics
Since Prior's time, it has become a standard to study tense-logical systems
in terms of semantical models based on the idea of branching time. This
idea was not realised in Prior's early works on temporal logic. Indeed it
had not yet been formulated in his Time and Modality (1957), which
otherwise marked the major breakthrough of the new logic of time. As an
explicit (or formalised) idea, branching time was first suggested to Prior in
a letter from Saul Kripke in September 1958. This letter contains an initial
version of the idea and a system of branching time, although it was not
worked out in details. Kripke, who was then only 17 years old, suggested
that we may consider the present as a point of Rank 1, and possible events
or states at the next moment as points of Rank 2; for every such possible
state in turn, there would be various possible future states at the next
moment from Rank 3, the set of which could be labelled Rank 4, and so
forth. Kripke wrote:
Now in an indetermined system, we perhaps should not regard
time as a linear series, as you have done. Given the present
moment, there are several possibilities for what the next moment
may be like – and for each possible next moment, there are several
possibilities for the next moment after that. Thus the situation takes
the form, not of a linear sequence, but of a “tree”… [Letter from
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In this way it is possible to form a tree structure representing the entire set
of possible futures expanding from the present (Rank 1) – indeed a set of
possible futures can be said to be identified for any state, or node in the
tree. In this structure every point determines a subtree consisting of its
own present and possible futures. Kripke illustrated this idea in the
following way:
In the letter Kripke wrote:
In Prior's opinion the notion of branching time is certainly not
unproblematic. After all it is a representation of time in terms of space.
Saul Kripke to A.N. Prior, dated September 3, 1958, kept in the
Prior Collection at Bodleian Library, Oxford, Box 4. See also
Ploug et al. 2012.]
The point 0 (or origin) is the present, and the points 1, 2, and 3 (of
rank 2) are the possibilities for the next moment. If the point 1
actually does come to pass, 4, 5, and 6 are its possible successors,
and so on. The whole tree then represents the entire set of
possibilities for present and future; and every point determines a
subtree consisting of its own present and future.
Future Contingents
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The notion seems to involve the idea that the ‘Now’ is moving through the
system. Several authors have argued that the picture of a moving point
within the branching time system is rather problematic. In fact, this
problem of the ‘Now’ as a moving point goes back to Jack Smart (1949).
Later it has been debated by Storrs McCall (1976, p. 348, 1995) and
Graham Nerlich (1995). Recently MacFarlane has pointed out that there is
nothing such a motion could represent, since we have already represented
time as one of the spatial dimensions of the tree (MacFarlane 2008, p. 86).
It seems that Prior right from the beginning was aware of the basic
conceptual problems involved in the notion of branching time. However,
he certainly found this notion useful as long as it is applied carefully.
During the 1960s he substantially developed the idea. He worked out the
formal details of several different systems, which constitute different and
even competing interpretations of the idea of branching time, as we shall
see below.
A tense-logical model (TIME,≤,C,TRUE) based on a branching time
system is a structure, where (TIME,≤) is a partially ordered set of
moments of time, and C is a set of so-called histories or chronicles i.e.,
maximally ordered linear subsets in (TIME,≤). It is standard procedure
how to define ‘=’ and ‘<’ in terms of ‘≤’. The before/after relation, <, is
supposed to be irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive and backwards linear.
Backwards linearity means “no backwards branching” i.e.
for all moments of time t0, t1, and t2.
In addition, historical connectedness may be considered as an axiom, i.e.,
it may be assumed that c1 ∩ c2 ≠ ∅, for any two chronicles c1 and c2 in
the branching time system.
(t1 < t0 ∧ t2 < t0) ⊃ (t1 < t2 ∨ t2 < t1 ∨ t2 = t1)
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In many branching time models C will just be the set of all maximally
ordered linear subsets in (TIME,≤). In such cases C will not be an
independent parameter of the model. In other cases, however, there will be
some additional restrictions on C, i.e., it will be a proper subset of the set
of all maximally ordered linear subsets in (TIME,≤). In some branching
time models there will also be introduced a relation of (counterfactually)
co-temporaneous moments. Given that such a relation is an equivalence
relation, it may give rise to the definition of instants as equivalence classes
of co-temporaneous moments.
For any propositional constant, p, and any moment in TIME, t, there is a
truth-value, TRUE(p,t). This means that the truth-value of a propositional
constant does not vary with the chronicles. The truth-value of a
propositional constant depends only on the moment. On this basis the
truth-value of any well formed formula (wff) has to be defined recursively.
In the following sections we shall see that this can be done in several
different ways.
It may, however, be objected that it is problematic to operate with two
different kinds of propositions: 1) propositional constants with truth-
values that do not vary with the chronicles and 2) other wffs with truth-
values that may vary with the chronicles. Thomason (1970, p. 280) has
pointed out that this distinction means that substitution of propositions in
the system will have to be restricted, since we will not be allowed to
substitute a propositional constant with an arbitrary wff. Prior was aware
of this, but he argued that it is in fact possible to handle a system with
restrictions on the substitution-rules. (See Prior 1967, p. 122 ff.)
4. The Solutions Based on Rejection of the Principle
of Future Excluded Middle
Future Contingents
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A truth-theory may involve the rejection of the principle of future
excluded middle, (P5), for at least two different reasons:
1. The theory may imply that future contingents are neither true nor
false, but undetermined (often conceived as a third truth-value).
2. The theory may be based on the idea that all future contingents are
false.
A possible third position would be to maintain that all future contingents
are true. Strictly speaking, such a claim does not contradict (P5) as
mentioned in section 2, although it does in fact contradict a version of (P5)
formulated in terms of an exclusive disjunction. However, from a
philosophical point of view, such a claim has had no serious role to play in
the debate, even though the assumption of all future contingents being true
is in fact what holds in the early tense-logical systems, Kt and Kb,
introduced in (Prior 1967, p. 187) and in (Rescher and Urquhart, p. 68 ff.).
The problem is that it is highly counter-intuitive to accept both “Tomorrow
there will be a sea-battle” and “Tomorrow there will not be a sea-battle” as
true now. It seems that if one of these propositions is true now, then the
other has to be false. On these grounds, we shall not consider this
possibility any further in this context.
In the two following subsections, we shall briefly consider some solutions
corresponding to the possibilities 1 and 2 mentioned above.
4.1 Jan Łukasiewicz' Three-valued Semantics
In a series of articles during the 1920s and 30s the Polish logician Jan
Łukasiewicz (1878–1956) advocated a particular interpretation of
Aristotle's discussion of the status of sentences about the contingent
future, as developed in his sea-battle example. Łukasiewicz' interpretation
crucially rests on a rejection of the principle of bivalence. In fact, this kind
of interpretation was not new, but had been formulated already by the
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Epicureans. However, Łukasiewicz presented this position more clearly
than had ever been done before, and developed it with the aid of modern
symbolic logic. He used his interpretation of Aristotle and the status of
sentences about the contingent future as an argument against logical
determinism and in favor of logical indeterminism, for which he declared
his wholehearted support. In order to avoid determinism, he found it
necessary to restrict the validity of bivalence by introducing a third truth-
value. This truth-value, ‘undetermined’, is applied to contingent
propositions regarding the future (McCall 1967, p. 64). For instance, a
proposition stating that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow can be assigned
the truth-value undetermined today. This is because today it is not given or
definitely determined whether the sea-battle is actually going to take place
tomorrow or not.
It is an important property of Łukasiewicz' three-valued logic that the
truth-value of the disjunction of two undetermined propositions is
undetermined, i.e., (p ∨ q) is undetermined for p undetermined and q
undetermined. This may be based on the observation that since p ≡ (p ∨ p),
a disjunction of two undetermined propositions has to be undetermined. If
p is undetermined, ~p is also undetermined. It follows that (p ∨ ~p) is
undetermined for p undetermined. This problem also occurs for future
contingents such as F(x)q and F(x)~q. According to Łukasiewicz' trivalent
logic: if F(x)q and F(x)~q are two future contingents, i.e., if they are both
undetermined, then the same will be the case for the disjunction of the two
statements, F(x)q ∨ F(x)~q. This means that the theory leads to the
rejection of the principle of (P5).
In general, it does not seem possible to solve the problem of future
contingents in terms of three-valued semantics in a satisfactory manner if
the logic is truth-functional, i.e., if the truth-value of any proposition used
in the logic is determined by the truth-values of its parts. As argued by
Prior (1953, p. 326) it will not help to change the truth-tables to something
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different from Łukasiewicz' model. As long as the model or theory is
truth-functional, it is obvious that the two disjunctions (F(x)q ∨ ~F(x)q)
and (F(x)q ∨ F(x)q) will have the same truth-value. From an intuitive and
common sense point of view, this is not satisfactory, since (F(x)q ∨
~F(x)q) is clearly true, whereas (F(x)q ∨ F(x)q) is undetermined, given
that F(x)q is undetermined.
Łukasiewicz' interpretation of the Aristotelian text was disputed by Prior
(1962, p.240 ff.), who pointed out that there is a significant difference
between Łukasiewicz' trivalent logic and Aristotle's text. Prior pointed out
that according to Aristotle it is true already today, that either there will or
there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow, whereas this disjunction, as just
mentioned, is undetermined according to Łukasiewicz' trivalent logic.
4.2 The Peircean Solution
The solution Prior himself favored is based on so-called Peircean models.
Prior demonstrated that the semantics of these models can be presented in
two different ways. In the following we shall concentrate on the first of
these possibilities, but also comment briefly on the other possible
approach to the Peircean solution.
In order to define the Peircean models according to Prior's first attempt, it
is assumed that there is a valuation function, TRUE, which gives a truth-
value (0 or 1) for any propositional constant at any moment in TIME. On
this basis, the valuation function of a Peircean model, Peirce(t,c,p) can be
defined recursively for any wff p, any moment of time t and any chronicle
c with t ∈ c:
(a) Peirce(t,c, p) = 1 iff TRUE(p,t) = 1, where p is any propositional
constant.
(b) Peirce(t,c, p∧q) = 1 iff both Peirce(t,c,p) = 1 and Peirce(t,c,q)  = 1
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(c) Peirce(t,c,~p) = 1 iff not Peirce(t,c,p) = 1
(d) Peirce(t,c,Fp)  = 1 iff for all cʹ with t ∈ cʹ there is some tʹ ∈ cʹ with t
< tʹ such that Peirce(tʹ,cʹ,p) = 1
(e) Peirce(t,c,Pp) = 1 iff Peirce(tʹ,c,p) = 1 for some tʹ ∈ c with tʹ < t
(f) Peirce(t,c,◊p) = 1 iff Peirce(t,cʹ,p)  = 1 for some cʹ with t ∈ cʹ
Strictly speaking, (a) – (f) do not define the function Peirce. These
conditions only explain when Peirce has the value 1. However, here and in
all models below we assume that the valuation function has the range
{0,1}. The value is 0, if it does not follow from the recursive definition
that it is 1.
In the Peircean system another future operator corresponding to the notion
of ‘possible future’ may also be defined, i.e.,
(g) Peirce(t,c,fp) = 1 iff Peirce(tʹ,cʹ,p) = 1 for some cʹ with t ∈ cʹ and
some tʹ ∈ cʹ with t < tʹ
In addition, G may de defined as ~f~ and g as ~F~. In this way the
Peircean system comprises four different future-oriented operators (f, g, F,
G).
It should also be mentioned that we can define the necessity operator, □, in
the usual manner, i.e., as ~ ◊ ~.
Peirce(t,c,q) = 1 can be read ‘q is true at t in the chronicle c’. A formula q
is said to be Peirce-valid if and only if Peirce(t,c,q) = 1 for any t in any c
in any branching time structure (TIME,≤,C) and any valuation function
TRUE.
To obtain a metric version of the Peircean system, a duration function has
to be added. Let dur(t1,t2,x) stand for the statement ‘t1 is x time units
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before t2’, where t1 and t2 belong to the same chronicle, and were x is a
positive number[3]. Using this function (d) and (e) above are replaced by:
(dʹ) Peirce(t,c,F(x)p) = 1 iff for all cʹ with t ∈ cʹ there is some tʹ ∈ cʹ with
dur(t,tʹ,x) such that Peirce(tʹ,cʹ,p) = 1
(eʹ) Peirce(t,c,P(x)p) = 1 iff Peirce(tʹ,c,p) = 1 for some tʹ ∈ c with dur(t
ʹ,t,x)
Given the truth clauses (a) – (e), the modality introduced in (f) is rather
trivial. For instance it follows that
is a Peirce-valid formula. This means that a statement about the future is
true in the Peircean sense only if it is true in all possible futures, i.e., only
if it has to be the case. It follows that if F(x)q is a future contingent, it will
be false according to the theory. The same will be the case for F(x)~q. For
this reason
will also be false. So the principle of future excluded middle, (P5), is not a
thesis in the system.
It may be objected that the use of the parameter c is not really needed in
the definition of the Peirce-function. Clearly, it has no role to play neither
in (a) – (e) nor in (g). The parameter is in fact used in (f), but this may be
said to be rather unimportant, since as indicated above necessity is in fact
incorporated in the Peircean notion of future. Based on such
considerations Prior (1967, p. 132 ff.) showed that the Peircean models
may in fact be defined in terms of a simpler Peirce-function without any
reference to the parameter c (i.e. the chronicles), if it is assumed that (f)
can be left out of the Peircean system in question. The main advantage of
F(x)q ⊃ □F(x)q
F(x)q ∨ F(x)~q
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keeping the extended formalism, is that it facilitates its comparison with
the system to be presented in section 5.1.
According to the Peircean system the future should simply be identified
with the necessary future. More precisely, to say something about the
future is to say something about the necessary future. Although the
identification of the future with the necessary future makes the position
counter-intuitive, A.N. Prior and many of his followers favored this
possibility. The reason is that Prior strongly believed in free choice and
held that this freedom is essential for the understanding of the very notion
of future. According to Prior nobody (not even God) can know what a
person will freely choose, before the person has made his or her choice. So
whatever could make a statement about a future choice by some free agent
true now? From Prior's point of view, nothing. Hence, such statements
must be false. In his Some Free Thinking about Time, Prior maintained
that “if something is the work of a free agent, then it wasn't going to be the
case until that agent decided that it was” (Copeland 1996, p.48).
Consider the consequences of (dʹ) and (eʹ) when applied to the following
model:
In this case the Peircean position implies that F(y)p is true at t2, whereas
F(x)F(y)p is false at t1 and P(x)F(x)F(y)p is consequently false at t2. This
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means that (P1) must be rejected in this system.
In general the formula
is not Peirce-valid.
It can be concluded that in the Peircean system both (P1) and (P5) must be
rejected.
Many researchers have studied the formalities of the Peircean system.
Axiomatizations of the non-metrical version of the system can be found in
(Burgess 1980) and in (Zanardo 1990).
5. The Solutions Based on the Rejection of the
Necessity of the Past
As argued for instance in (Gabbay et al. 2000, p. 65), the Peircean system
has some obvious weaknesses, which make the system problematic as a
satisfactory candidate for a theory of future contingency. First of all, the
system fails to represent many common-sense notions of time, which are
arguably reasonable. This is due to the fact that the idea of a plain future
as a ‘middle ground’ between possible future and necessary future cannot
be expressed in the Peircean system. Suppose I say:
I do not mean that tomorrow perhaps will be sunny in London, or maybe
not; I mean that indeed it will be the case; but on the other hand I do not
mean that there is no other option, or that it must be so. One should be
aware that in adopting the Peircean system, one would have to consider
this everyday intuition illusory — there really is only the ‘possibly’, or the
q ⊃ P(z)F(z)q
“It will be sunny in London tomorrow”
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‘necessarily’ (corresponding to fp and Fp mentioned in the (g) and (d)
clauses in section 4.2). In fact, logically speaking, in this system “it will be
sunny in London tomorrow” would have to be considered as equivalent to
either
or
In addition, it should be noticed that it is a crucial feature of the Pericean
system that the expressions F(x)~q and ~F(x)q are non-equivalent. This
certainly gives rise to a serious challenge when confronted with everyday
intuition. In fact, it is rather difficult to make a clear distinction between
the two expressions in terms of natural language. E.g. it is doubtable
whether a distinction between “tomorrow it will not be sunny in London”
and “it is not the case that tomorrow will be sunny in London” will be
accepted as sufficiently clear.
For such reasons many scholars have found it rather problematic to reject
(P5). Instead they have focused on systems accepting (P5) but rejecting
(P3). In the following we shall consider five such theories.
5.1 Prior's Ockhamist Solution
In Past, Present and Future Prior presented his so-called Ockhamist
system, which accepts (P5) but rejects (P3) (see Prior 1967, p. 126 ff.).
This system is inspired by some of the ideas formulated by William of
Ockham.
As with the Peircean semantics, it is assumed that there is a truth-function,
TRUE, which gives a truth-value (0 or 1) for any propositional constant at
“Possibly, it will be sunny in London tomorrow”
“Necessarily, it will be sunny in London tomorrow”.
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any moment in TIME. On this basis, the valuation function of an
Ockhamist model, Ock(t,c,p) can be defined recursively for any wff p, any
moment of time t, and any chronicle c with t ∈ c:
Here C(t) is defined as the set of chronicles through t, i.e., C(t) = {c| t ∈
c}.
We define the dual operators, H, G, and □  in the usual manner as ~P~,
~F~, and ~ ◊ ~ respectively.
Ock(t,c,p) = 1 can be read ‘p is true at t in the chronicle c’. A formula p is
said to be Ockham-valid if and only if Ock(t,c,p) = 1 for any t in any c in
any branching time structure, (TIME,≤,C) and any valuation function
TRUE. Here C should not be taken as an independent parameter. In this
case C is just the set of all maximally ordered linear subsets in (TIME,≤).
Furthermore, it should be noted that relative to a single chronicle, (a) – (e)
are exactly the same definitions as those used in linear tense-logic (i.e. the
tense-logic which follows if (TIME,≤) is a linear structure).
Prior himself did not accept the view represented in the Ockhamist system,
but as many later researchers he was interested in the exploration of the
system. It should be mentioned that the basic views held by Belnap et al.
(2001) are in fact rather close to Priorean Ockhamism, although there are
(a) Ock(t,c,p) = 1 iff TRUE(p,t) = 1, where p is any
propositional constant.
(b) Ock(t,c,p∧q) = 1 iff both Ock(t,c,p) = 1 and Ock(t,c,q) = 1
(c) Ock(t,c,~p) = 1 iff not Ock(t,c,p) = 1
(d) Ock(t,c,Fp) = 1 iff Ock(tʹ,c,p) = 1 for some tʹ ∈ c with t < tʹ
(e) Ock(t,c,Pp) = 1 iff Ock(tʹ,c,p) = 1 for some tʹ ∈ c with tʹ < t
(f) Ock(t,c,◊p) = 1 iff Ock(t,cʹ,p) = 1 for some cʹ ∈ C(t)
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certainly many further developments of the theory in Belnap's
philosophical writings on the subject (Belnap 1992, 2001, 2003, 2005).
Belnap has strongly emphasized the distinction between what he calls
‘plain truth’ and ‘settled truth’. Whereas plain truth corresponds to the
branch-dependent truth used in the Ockhamistic model, settled truth will
be branch-independent, i.e., truth at a moment of time. It should also be
pointed out that in the definition of Ock, only (d) differs from the
corresponding Peircean definition. In fact, Prior (1967, p.130) has pointed
out that the Peircean system may be seen as a fragment of the Ockhamistic
system in which F does not occur except as immediately preceded by an
necessity operator.
To obtain a metric version of the Ockhamist system, a duration function
has to be added. Let dur(t1,t2,x) stand for the statement ‘t1 is x time units
before t2’. Using this formalism, (d) and (e) are replaced by:
It can be verified that neither P(x)q ⊃ □P(x)q nor Pq ⊃ □Pq are Ockham-
valid for all q. Let for instance q stand for F(y)p. It is easy to verify that
P(x)F(y)p ⊃ □ P(x)F(y)p will not in general hold in an Ockhamistic
branching time model. This may be illustrated using the following
diagram, in which it is easily seen that Ock(t, c1, P(x)F(y)p) = 1, whereas
Ock(t, c1, □P(x)F(y)p) = 0 since Ock(t, c2, P(x)F(y)p) = 0.
(dʹ) Ock(t,c,F(x)p) = 1 iff Ock(tʹ,c,p) = 1 for some tʹ ∈ c with
dur(t,tʹ,x)
(eʹ) Ock(t,c,P(x)p) = 1 iff Ock(tʹ,c,p) = 1 for some tʹ ∈ c with
dur(tʹ,t,x)
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This does away with (P3) in the formal version of the medieval argument
discussed above. Still, both formulas, P(x)q ⊃ □P(x)q and Pq ⊃ □Pq, will
hold if the truth of q does not depend on what the future brings.
If (P3) does not hold in general, one may reject (2) in the argument in
section 2. According to Ockham, (P3) (that is, its verbal analogue as he
could formulate it with the means then available) should only be accepted
for statements which are genuinely about the past, i.e., which do not
depend on the future. According to this view, (P3) may be denied precisely
because the truth of statements like P(x)F(x)F(y)q has not been settled yet
— since they depend on the future.
In this way, one can make a distinction between “soft facts” and “hard
facts” regarding the past (see Plantinga 1986). Following the Ockhamist
position, a statement like P(x)q would correspond to a hard fact, if q does
not depend on the future, whereas statements like P(x)F(x)F(y)q would
represent soft facts. Critics of the Ockhamist position, however, may still
say that if F(x)F(y)q was true x time units ago, then there must have been
something making it true at that time, and that something must have been
a hard fact. On the other hand, supporters of the position hold that it is
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fully conceivable and acceptable that what makes a statement true could
also be a soft fact, i.e., something which depends on the future.
The rationality of Ockham's suggestion according to which future
happenings can (in a very limited sense) influence the past, has been
defended by Alvin Plantinga (1986). It should also be mentioned that
Ockham's theory is relevant for the conceptual analysis of the idea of
prophecy (see the entry on prophecy).
However, it may be disputed that Prior's Ockhamist system fits the ideas
formulated by William of Ockham completely. Although many of
Ockham's original ideas are satisfactorily modelled in Prior's Ockhamist
system, Prior's system (1967) lacks a proper representation of the notion
of ‘the true future’.[4] This was in fact one of the most basic ideas in
Ockham's world view. Ockham believed that there is truth (or falsity) also
of statements about the contingent future, which human beings cannot
know, but which God knows. Prior's Ockhamist system cannot be said to
include more than the idea of a proposition being true relative to a moment
of time and a chronicle. A proper theory in accordance with William of
Ockham's ideas would have to include the idea of a proposition being true
relative to a moment of time (without any specification of a chronicle). Let
us therefore investigate a truth-theory which includes the idea of a true
future in this sense.
5.2 The Leibnizian Theory
An alternative approach to the semantics for future contingents is inspired
by the works of Leibniz and has been called a Leibnizian semantics (see
Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995). According to this view the set of possible
histories is not seen as a traditional tree structure, but as a system of
‘parallel lines’. On the set of ‘parallel lines’ a relation corresponding to
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qualitative identity up to a certain instant is defined. In such a model it
will be straightforward to introduce truth-values for future contingents.
The idea can be introduced in terms of Prior's Ockhamistic model. As
mentioned above any maximally ordered linear subset in (TIME,≤) will be
accepted as a chronicle in the Ockhamistic model. However, in the
Leibnizian model only some of these subsets will be accepted as
chronicles, although the union of all chronicles will still be the full set
TIME, i.e., any moment will belong to at least one Leibnizian chronicle.
The set of ‘parallel lines’ in the system may just be a subset of the set of
all chronicles considered in the Ockhamistic model. Formally, each
temporal moment in the Leibnizian semantics corresponds to a pair of a
moment of time, m, and a chronicle, c, with m ∈ c. This means that any
Leibnizian time can be written as a structured formal object temp(m,c),
where m ∈ c. The Leibnizian valuation function can be defined in terms of
Prior's Ockhamistic model in the following way:
Formally, this means that in the Leibnizian semantics the truth-value of a
proposition only depends on the Leibnizian time. According to this
semantics (P3) is obviously not valid in general.
A semantics introduced in this manner also fits with models defined in
terms of so-called bundled trees (see Zanardo 2003), and it is similar to the
approach taken by David K. Lewis in his On the Plurality of Worlds
(1986).
On the Leibnizian view p ⊃ P(x)F(x)p holds, whereas p ⊃ P(x) □ F(x)p
does not hold. This may be illustrated in the following way:
Leib(temp(m,c),p) = Ock(m,c,p)
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This diagram illustrates that chronicles may be represented as parallel
lines up to a certain temporal instant (containing both t1 = temp(m1,c) and
t1ʹ = temp(m1,cʹ)), from where they diverge. Until the ‘branching point’
the chronicles are indistinguishable.
According to a Leibnizian semantics propositions without modal
operators, such as p ⊃ P(x)F(x)p, will have to be evaluated within the sub-
model defined by the chronicle (i.e., in fact a linear model). The point is
that to determine the truth-value of a formula without modals at a
Leibnizian time defined as t = temp(m,c), one need not look at other
chronicles than c if the evaluation is going to take place on the basis of
Leibnizian semantics. However, in the above model the proposition
p ⊃ P(x)□F(x)p will not be true at t2 = temp(m2,c) since even if p is true at
t2 and t1 = temp(m1,c) is a time x time units earlier earlier than t2, the
proposition □F(x)p will be false at t1, since there is a co-temporal moment
t1ʹ at which F(x)p is false.
From a formal point of view the semantics of the Leibnizian theory may
be seen as an alternative interpretation of the semantics of the Ockhamist
theory with the only difference that in the Leibnizian theory not all
maximal linear subsets have to be accepted as proper chronicles in the
model.
Some philosophers have argued that the Leibnizian theory at least in some
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Ockhamistic theory. The reason is that there exist some rather intricate
propositions which some hold to be intuitively invalid, which they are
according to the Leibnizian theory, although they are valid according to
the Ockhamist theory. One such example can be given in terms of these
two statements:
Hirokazu Nishimura (1979) has argued that if time is assumed to be
discrete, then an Ockhamist cannot consistently accept the conjunction of
p1 and p2, whereas a Leibnizian can maintain such a view without
contradicting himself. The purpose of the following figure is to clarify the
difference between these two views.
p1: “Inevitably, if today there is life on earth, then either this is
the last day (of life on earth), or the last day will come.”
p2: “At any possible day on which there is life on earth, it is
possible that there will be life on earth the following day.”
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As indicated in the above figure, an infinite number of ovals named i1, i2,
i3, i4,… represent a series of instants i.e., equivalence classes of co-
temporaneous moments, as mentioned in section 3. The cronicles are
named c1, c2, c3, c4,… . For n∈{1,2,3,4,…} the moment corresponding to
in on cn will be the last day of life on earth. The totality of this infinity of
chronicles represents the acceptance of p1. At the last day on each of these
chronicles, cj, it would in fact be possible that life on earth could have
continued yet another day. This is evident because of the existence in the
model of cj+1. Taken together this means that the statement p2 holds at any
possible day in the model. This is what a Leibnizian would say. However,
an Ockhamist would say, that given this model it would be possible to
construct a chronicle c*, as shown on the above figure for which the last
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day of life on earth would never come. According to the Leibnizian, this
construction of c* may not be permitted at all, since c* may in fact be a
maximal linear subset which does not belong to C.
The point is that in the Ockhamist semantics, any maximal linear subset of
TIME is accepted as a chronicle. In the Leibnizian semantics, the set of
chronicles is an independent parameter. In a Leibnizian model, any subset
of the set of all maximal linear subsets could be accepted as the set of
chronicles, C, as long as all moments in TIME belong to at least one
chronicle.
Belnap et al. have argued that it is implausible to assume that there could
be some property which could “justify treating some maximal chains as
real possibilities and others as not” (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 205). On the
other hand, Nishimura's example is in fact a rather remarkable argument
suggesting that not all maximal chains have to be accepted as chronicles in
the semantics for future contingents. The example also speaks in favor of
the view that the Leibnizian theory is more plausible than Prior's
Ockhamistic theory, see (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995, p. 268).
The Leibnizian and Prior's Ockhamistic views seem to be very similar, and
most differences between them seem to be nuances of metaphysical
interpretation. In fact, the Leibnizian way of introducing truth-values for
future contingents seems somewhat tricky. It should also be mentioned
that if the idea of chronicles as ‘parallel lines’ is taken seriously, then there
is no proper branching in the Leibnizian model. For this reason, it can be
argued that this model is incompatible with objective indeterminism, since
the alternative lines should not be counted as proper possibilities, see e.g.
(MacFarlane 2003, p. 325). On the other hand, it may be argued that all
the conceivable chronicles in the Leibnizian model represent logical
possibilities. Obviously, only some of them are chosen, but from a logical
point of view any of them could in principle have been chosen. Still, it
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may be objected that the Leibnizian model is rather sophisticated and
speculative, and that it may be more attractive to look for other ways of
defining “truth at a moment of time”.
5.3 The True Futurist Theory: The Thin Red Line
The medieval assumption of the true future can in terms of modern logic
and a branching time model be rendered as meaning that there is a
privileged branch (i.e., a specific chronicle) in the model. If b is this
privileged branch, then the truth-value of a proposition, p, at a moment of
time, t, may be defined in terms of the Ockhamistic valuation function as
Ock(t,b,p). This solution has been studied in (Øhrstrøm 1981) and further
elaborated and discussed in (Malpass et al. 2012) and (Borghini et al.
2013). Consider, for instance, the following model, in which the arrows
indicate the true future at any moment.
In this model, F(x)q is true at t2 and F(x+y)q is true at t1, although none of
the propositions are necessary, since F(x)~q is possible at t2. The reason
why F(x)q is true at t2 is just that the evaluation of a proposition according
to the true futurist theory should be based on the specified branch through
t2 representing ‘the future’ at t2 within the model. However, as we shall
see in the following, it turns out that the idea of a specified branch at every
moment can be integrated into the semantics in several ways. But first of
all some comments on the very idea of a specified branch.
Future Contingents
34 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
What makes the specified branch privileged? Is it just that it represents
what is going to happen? Is there anything in the present situation, t2,
which makes one branch ontologically special as opposed to the other
branches? It might be tempting to refer to some sort of a ‘wait-and-see’
status of the privileged branch, since we have no way of knowing which
branch is the specified one representing ‘the future’ except by waiting.
Some authors have held that the idea of a privileged branch is
incompatible with indeterminism. Hence Rich Thomason (1970, 1984) has
argued that from an indeterministic point of view no special branch
deserves to be called the true future. Of course, the problem is what
exactly the idea of indeterminism implies. According to MacFarlane, it is
problematic to give one future branch a special status, if we want to hang
on to objective indeterminism regarding the future (MacFarlane 2003, p.
325). On the other hand, although the true futurist theory does contain
some intricate notions, it has not been shown to be inconsistent, and a
supporter of the theory may still hold that the theory correctly explains
what reality is like. It should be borne in mind that true futurist theory was
introduced exactly to avoid what many have held to be counter-intuitive
tenets, e.g. that all future contingents are false now (the Peircean view), or
that they have no chronicle-independent truth-values now (the
Ockhamistic view). Therefore, it should be carefully considered which
approach ultimately leads to the fewest problems.
According to Belnap and Green a true futurist theory should include the
idea that at any moment of time – including any counterfactual moment –
there is a true future, a so-called ‘thin red line’ (Belnap and Green 1994),
passing through that moment. Formally, this means that there must be a
function, TRL, which gives the true future for any moment of time, t. More
precisely, TRL(t) yields the linear past as well as the true future of t,
extended to a maximal set.[5]
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In fact, the idea of adding a function like TRL to the semantical model had
earlier been suggested by (McKim and Davis 1976) and by (Thomason
and Gupta 1980). But unlike Belnap and Green these authors did not name
the function in any spectacular way.
It would of course be fatal for the true futurist theory if it could be
demonstrated that it contradicts assumptions which we for other reasons
should accept. Belnap and Green (1994) have argued that there are in fact
such fundamental problems related to the true futurist picture. They have
argued that it is not sufficient for the model to specify a preferred branch
corresponding to the true history (past, present, and future): it must be
assumed that there is a preferred branch at every counterfactual moment.
They have illustrated their view using the following statement:
This statement may be represented in terms of tense logic with τ
representing tails and η heads, respectively:
and in terms of the following branching time structure:
“The coin will come up heads. It is possible, though that it will
come up tails, and then later it will come up tails again (though at
this moment it could come up heads), and then, inevitably, still
later it will come up tails yet again.” (Belnap & Green 1994, p.
379)
F(1)η ∧ ◊F(1)(τ ∧ ◊F(1)η ∧ F(1)(τ ∧ □F(1)τ))
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The example shows that if we want to take this kind of everyday reasoning
into account, we need to be able to speak not only about the future, but
also about what would be the future at any counterfactual moment. As
mentioned above this is formally done in terms of the TRL-function. But
what are the constraints on this function? Belnap and Green have argued
that:
should hold in general. Moreover, they have also maintained that:
should hold for the TRL-function. On the other hand, they have argued
that the combination of (TRL1) and (TRL2) is inconsistent with the very
idea of branching time. The reason is that if (TRL1) and (TRL2) are both
accepted, it follows from t1 < t2 that t2 ∈ TRL(t1) i.e., that all moments of
time after t1 would have to belong to the thin red line through t1, which
means that there will in fact be no branching at all. However, it is very
hard to see why a true futurist would have to accept (TRL2), which seems
(TRL1)   t ∈ TRL(t)
(TRL2)   t1 < t2 ⊃ TRL(t1) = TRL(t2)
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to be too strong a requirement. Rather than (TRL2), the weaker condition
(TRL2ʹ) can be employed:
This seems to be much more natural in relation to the notion of a true
futurist branching time logic. Belnap has later accepted that (TRL2ʹ) is a
plausible alternative to (TRL2) (see Belnap et al. 2001, p. 169).
We can inductively define a chronicle-independent valuation function,
using TRUE, which as mentioned in section 4.2 gives a truth-value (0 or 1)
for any propositional constant at any moment in TIME, and using the
TRL-function. On this basis, the valuation function, T(t,p) can be defined
recursively for any wff p, and any moment of time t:
T(t,q) = 1 can be read ‘q is true at t’. As in section 4.2 the valuation
function has the range {0,1}. A formula q is said to be T-valid if and only
if T(t,q) = 1 for any t in any branching time structure (TIME,≤,C), any
valuation function TRUE, and any TRL-function defined on TIME.
This means that sentences only involving tenses are what Belnap (in honor
of Carnap) has called ‘moment-determinate’ (Belnap 1991, p. 163),
indicating that their truth-value doesnʹt vary with the chronicle. The
(TRL2ʹ)   (t1 < t2 ∧ t2 ∈ TRL(t1)) ⊃ TRL(t1) = TRL(t2)
(a) T(t, p) = 1 iff TRUE(p,t) = 1, where p is any propositional
constant.
(b) T(t, p∧q) = 1 iff both T(t,p) = 1 and T(t,q) = 1
(c) T(t,~p) = 1 iff not T(t,p) = 1
(d) T(t,Pq) = 1 iff there is some tʹ with tʹ<t and T(tʹ,q) = 1
(e) T(t,Fq) = 1 iff there is some tʹ ∈ TRL(t) with t<tʹ and T(tʹ,q)
= 1
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advantage of this view is that it corresponds with everyday reasoning and
natural language understanding as it is most commonly conceived.
As in sections 4.2 and 5.1, it is possible to extend the language in order to
take metrical notions into consideration:
Belnap and Green have argued that the constraints on the TRL-function
should give rise to a logic in which the following theorems hold:
If we accept the constraints (TRL1) and (TRL2ʹ), and use the above
recursive definition of the valuation function T(t,p), we obtain a semantics
according to which (T1) and (T2) are valid.
However, with the semantics presented above, (T3) will not be valid. To
see why this is the case, consider a situation with a moment of time t1 such
that t1 ∉ TRL(t0) for any t0<t1. Assume that t1 is the only moment at
which q is true. Then PFq, hence also q ⊃ PFq, will be false at t1.
Even the formula
is false when evaluated with semantics of this kind.
T(t,P(x)q) = 1 iff ∃tʹ: dur(tʹ,t,x) & T(tʹ,q) = 1
T(t,F(x)q) = 1 iff ∃tʹ: dur(t,tʹ,x) & tʹ ∈ TRL(t) & T(tʹ,q) = 1
(T1)   PPq ⊃ Pq
(T2)   FFq ⊃ Fq
(T3)   q ⊃ PFq
(T3ʹ)   q ⊃ P(x)F(x)q
Peter Øhrstrøm and Per Hasle
Winter 2015 Edition 39
The rejection of (T3ʹ) can be illustrated by the following diagram, in
which the arrow on the upper branch indicates the thin red line. (The
vertical line in this diagram represents a set of co-temporaneous moments,
i.e., what is sometimes called an instant.)
According to this diagram q holds at the counterfactual moment of time, t.
However, as indicated in the diagram F(x)q was false x time units earlier
than t, since at that time tʹ would be the true future x time units later.
The rejection of (T3) and (T3ʹ) is not the only problem related to a TRL-
semantics defined in this way. It should also be pointed out that it is
somewhat complicated to state the semantics of modal expressions if we
follow this procedure, since it may involve the quantification over possible
TRL-functions. This approach has been further investigated in (Braüner et
al. 1998).
There is, however, a simpler strategy which makes it possible to ensure the
validity of (T3) and (T3ʹ) even if one wants to insist on the assumption of
the thin red line. This can be done by defining “true at time t ” in terms of
“true at time t and chronicle c”, as it is defined in the Ockhamist
semantics:
where p is an arbitrary propositional expression. T(t,p) = 1 can be read ‘p
is true at t’. This idea of obtaining a thin red line semantics by introducing
T(t,p) = Ock(t, TRL(t),p)
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a unique historical parameter has been discussed in (MacFarlane 2003,
330–331, cf. n. 10).
As in Prior's Ockhamistic model it is straightforward to introduce metrical
tense operators in this system.
As in the Leibniz-theory we should not necessarily assume that all
maximal linear subsets in the branching time structure should be taken
into account as chronicles in the semantics. It may be reasonable to
assume various restrictions regarding the set of chronicles and its use in
the semantical model. In fact, it has turned out to be interesting to consider
the possibilities of modifying the definition of C(t) used in (f) of the Ock
definition in section 5.1.
The following validity definition may be suggested:
Given this definition it is easily seen that (T1–3) and (T3ʹ) are all TRL-
valid. Regarding the interplay between the tense operators and the modal
operator, it is straightforward to verify that the following is TRL-valid:
whereas (P3) in section 2 will not be TRL-valid for propositions
depending on the future. However, the notion of validity suggested above
may also allow for the following definition of C(t), which has been
discussed in (Braüner et al. 2000):
(V) A formula p is said to be TRL-valid if and only if
Ock(t,TRL(t),p)  = 1 for any t in any branching time structure,
(TIME,≤,C), any valuation function TRUE, any definition of
C(t) with TRL(t) ∈ C(t) and C(t) ⊆ {c ∈ C| t ∈ c} for all t,
and any TRL-function for which (TRL1) and (TRL2ʹ) hold.
(T4)   F(x)p ⊃ ◊F(x)p
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Note that with this definition (TRL1) and (TRL2ʹ) together say exactly
that TRL(t) ∈ C(t). Also note that C(t) may contain more branches than
just TRL(t).
However, it should be mentioned that the possibility operator in this model
is somewhat surprising. In the obvious metrical extension of the system
the following formula is invalidated:
According to the usual Ockhamist semantics (T5) is valid. The rejection of
(T5) in the system presented in (Braüner et al. 2000) may be illustrated
with reference to the following model:
Here it is assumed that TRL(t)=c2 for all t on c2 after t2 and that TRL(t)=c3
for all t on c3 after t2. Clearly, this means that C(t2)={c2,c3}. In
consequence, the proposition ◊F(y)p holds at t2. This means that
F(x)◊F(y)p is true at t1. However, the proposition ◊F(x)F(y)p is false at t1,
since c2 is not included in C(t1). According to the definition, C(t1) should
include exactly the chronicles which pass through t1 and which
immediately after t1 are specified by the TRL-function. This means that
C(t1)={c1,c3}, and then (T5) turns out to be false at t1.
C(t) = {c | t ∈ c & TRL(tʹ)=c, for all tʹ ∈ c with t < tʹ}
(T5)   F(x)◊F(y)p ⊃ ◊F(x)F(y)p
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This rejection of (T5) amounts to the following idea: a chronicle may not
be available as a possibility now, although it may later become available.
That is, new possibilities may show up.
This example illustrates that true futurist logics satisfying requirements
which correspond to Belnap's and Green's semantical criteria may differ
significantly from Prior's Ockhamism. Even if we assume that (T1–4)
should be valid and that (TRL1) and (TRL2ʹ) should hold, we cannot be
sure that (T5) is valid. On the other hand, some might of course intuitively
find (T5) just as plausible as (T1–4), for which reason they would insist on
a definition of C(t) according to which (T5) is valid. This, of course,
means that the validity notion in (V) should be modified introducing
further restrictions on the acceptable definitions of C(t). In order to ensure
the validity of (T5) one might require that C(tʹ) ⊆ C(t) for all t and tʹ with
t <tʹ. Another possibility is of course to insist on the Ockhamistic
definition of C(t), i.e., C(t) = {c | t ∈ c}, in which case TRL-validity would
give the same result as Ockham-validity.
It should be added that although it is still an open question how TRL-
validity should be defined, this uncertainty does not influence the most
important property of the true futurist theory, i.e., the fact that it suggests a
semantical definition of what it means for a future contingent to be true.
Given a TRL-function, this definition works even at counterfactual
moments of time. In this way, the introduction of the TRL-function may
be seen as a formalization of Molina's notion of middle knowledge
mentioned in section 1 (see Øhrstrøm 2014).
5.4 The Supervaluationist Theory
Some logicians have argued that the notion of true future is unacceptable
on philosophical grounds or that it is at least unnecessary, since it is
possible to establish a semantic model accepting (P5) but rejecting (P3)
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without involving any idea of a true future. Richmond H. Thomason
(1970, 1981, 1984) has formulated a theory based on so-called
supervaluations. According to this theory a proposition p is true at a
moment t if and only if it is true at t for every chronicle c passing through
t, and a proposition p is false if and only if it is false for every chronicle c
passing through t. Formally speaking, we may again use the Ock-function
to recursively define truth at a moment t and a chronicle c. Then we may
define truth at a moment of time by supervaluating. This means that p is
true at t if and only if Ock(t,c,p) = 1 for all c with t ∈ c. Future contingent
propositions will not meet that condition, nor will their negations, so they
are considered neither true nor false. They are ‘indeterminate’ in the sense
that they lack truth-values.
This theory allows the supervaluationist to reject (P3) and to accept future
excluded middle, (P5), without accepting the idea of ‘the thin red line’ or
‘the true future’. It should be pointed out, however, that although this
theory implies a rejection of (P3), it does in fact accept a related inference
principle i.e., if P(x)p is true at a certain moment of time, t, then □P(x)p
will also be true at t.
Thomason has shown that the supervaluation theory can in fact meet some
of the basic challenges related to the future contingents. He has also
shown that the theory can be extended in such a way that it may also
incorporate deontic logic i.e., the logic of moral obligation (Thomason
1981, pp. 165 ff.). A crucial question for this approach is, however,
whether the idea of truth-value gaps for future contingents is
philosophically acceptable. In other words, is it acceptable that some well-
formed propositions simply lack truth-values?
A distinctive feature of Thomason's theory is that the usual truth-
functional technique breaks down. For instance, if F(1)p is a future
contingent, then F(1)p and F(1)~p are both ‘indeterminate’, but the
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conjunction F(1)p ∧ F(1)~p will be false and the disjunction
F(1)p ∨ F(1)~p will be true. It may be objected that it seems odd that a
disjunction could be true when neither of the disjuncts is true, and a
conjunction false when neither of the conjuncts is false.
5.5 Relativist Theory
Recently John MacFarlane (2003, 2008) has suggested a new approach to
the problem of future contingents. Like Nuel Belnap et al. (2001),
MacFarlane challenges the classical notion that the truth-value of a
statement or proposition should be determined solely with respect to the
context (including the moment) of utterance. He also agrees with Belnap
and Green in rejecting the idea of the true future (i.e., the thin red line).
But unlike Belnap, MacFarlane does not want to give up all talk of truth in
a context. In this way MacFarlane accepts the same definition as Belnap,
Green and Thomason of Ock(t,c,p), where t is a moment of time and c is a
history (or a chronicle), but differs on “truth at a moment” or “truth at a
context”.
According to MacFarlane's theory the truth of a statement should be
relativised to both a context of utterance and a context of assessment. The
context of utterance is the context in which the speech act is made. The
context of assessment is the context in which we assess the speech act.
According to the theory, a statement S is true as used in the context C and
assessed in the context Cʹ, if and only if S is true at m for every chronicle c
passing through m and mʹ, where m and mʹ are moments within the
contexts C and Cʹ with m ≤ mʹ. This means that a statement like “it will be
sunny tomorrow” is true as uttered yesterday and assessed from today,
given that it is in fact sunny today. But it will not be true assessed from
yesterday, given that it was not settled yesterday that today would be
sunny.
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It turns out that MacFarlane's theory implies an acceptance of the principle
of future excluded middle, (P5), and a rejection of the principle of the
necessity of the past, (P3). An advocate of the theory (i.e., a relativist) will
clearly also agree with supervaluationism in allowing for truth-value gaps.
However, in addition a relativist will accept the view that future
contingents can be true as assessed from a future context. For criticism of
MacFarlane's position see Heck 2006.
6. Conclusion
As we have seen, Lavenham's medieval attempt at systematising the
various possible responses to the problem of future contingents gives rise
to a classification. This classification is based on the observation that in
order to reject the logical argument for determinism we have to reject at
least one of the principles, (P3) (necessity of the past) and (P5) (the
principle of future excluded middle). It is also clear from Lavenham's
analysis that he wanted to focus on the question whether future
contingents have determinate truth-values. When formulated in terms of
the modern debate, the question is whether future contingents have
branch-independent truth-values. Or using Belnap's vocabulary: Is there
settled truth about future contingents? Using the reactions on the classical
argument mentioned in section 2 and the views on truth-values of future
contingents as two classification principles, we may group the solutions
considered in the following diagram:
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The classification of Belnap's view in the above diagram is based on the
assumption that his ‘settled true’ refers to ‘true’ as it is used in the present
context.
Regarding the classification represented in the diagram it should be noted
that from a logical point of view the two rows are not mutually exclusive.
However, although it would in principle be possible to reject both (P3) and
(P5), we do not know any important theory of that kind.
It should also be noted that the theories in the first row all formally make
use of the Ockhamist recursive semantics, although they differ in how or
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As we have seen, there are ongoing philosophical debates regarding future
contingents. There is still a focus on the questions represented in the
diagram, but other problems are also discussed. One problem which has
attracted much attention is the study of future contingents as seen in
relation to branching space-time and various ideas within physics. Here
Belnap (1992, 2003, 2005), Müller (2007, Müller et al. 2008), and Placek
(2000) have contributed significantly.
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Notes to Future Contingents
1. We use double quotes for quotations, direct or indirect, and example
sentences and expressions, whereas we use single quotes for terms and
names.
2. Another possible translation is “An impossible proposition cannot
follow after a possible one.” (See Rescher et al. 1971, p. 190.)
3. This definition might be extended for negative numbers as well,
assuming that dur(t1,t2,x) if and only if dur(t2,t1,-x).
4. In an earlier version of the Ockham model Prior did in fact include the
idea of “the true future”. Speaking about the Ockham models he wrote:
“In each … model there is a single designated route from left to right,
taking one direction only at each fork. This represents the actual course of
events.” (Prior 1966, p. 157). However, this idea was dropped in Prior’s
most famous presentation of the models which he published in his Past,
Present and Future (Prior 1967).
5. The term ‘the Thin Red Line’ was inspired by a report from the
Crimean War in The London Times: “The Russians dashed on towards that
thin red-line streak tipped with a line of steel.” It has even been suggested
that the thin red line should in fact be conceived as infrared indicating
“that the Thin Red Line does not imply that mortals are capable of seeing
the future.” (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 139)
At this point it is worth noting, that Prior when working with the draft for
his book Past, Present and Future (1967) used a similar idea of a red line
corresponding to the true future. He wrote the following on p. 6 in an
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undated draft titled “Postulate-sets for Tense-logic”, kept in the Prior
Collection at Bodleian Library, Oxford, Box 1:
(We owe this information to Alex Malpass.)
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In these models the course of time (in a rather broad sense of this
phrase) is represented by a line which, as it moves from left to
right (past to future), continually divides into branches, so that
from any given point on the diagram there is a unique route
backwards (to the left; to the past) but a variety of routes forwards
(to the right; to the future). In each model there is a single
designated point, representing the actual present moment; and in an
Occamist model there is a single designated line (taking one only
of the possible forward routes at each fork), which might be picked
out in red, representing the actual course of events.
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